Apocalypse Now?

WHAT would the world look like were President Trump to press the nuclear button? Previous presidents have chosen to ignore the clamourings from the tinpot dictators of North Korea. Trump, however, has discarded the calm, nuanced diplomacy of his predecessors. This is Donald Trump: the president whose threats of “fire and fury like this world has never seen before” with a regime notorious for its nuclear program were only the second most talked about thing in the US that week. If the regime is to fall, it may as well do so explosively – nuclear war could conceivably happen, as harrowing a prospect as it is. War might not be imminent, nor inevitable, but alternatives are thinning. So again, how would the worst case scenario leave the world?

Destruction

The answer, of course, depends. Primarily, on how long the North Korean regime has to react and inflict damage on the outside world.  The closest and most affected target would be South Korea. In Prisoners of Geography, Tim Marshall posits that the hills to the north of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) – the border between North and South – are heavily fortified with artillery. Unfortunately for the South, its capital Seoul lies only 35 miles south of the DMZ. The artillery are all thought capable of hitting the Greater Seoul Region, the capital and its surrounding area, in which half of the country’s 50 million citizens reside. Even if it took the US and the South only a day to eradicate the artillery entrenched in the hills, Seoul would be devastated and with it, significant portions of the country’s manufacturing and finance industries.

Experts believe Kim Jong Un possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (known as ICBMs) that are capable of hitting the US’ major cities – that includes New York, Chicago and Washington. Until very recently, this threat was isolated to targets on the West Coast such as Alaska or Los Angeles. US military bases in Japan and South Korea would also be targeted, with potentially further action against civilian centres in Japan. Even worse, the US military now believes North Korea has the capability to miniaturise nuclear weapons to attach to their ICBMs. The later a war comes, the more reliable their technology and the greater the potential damage the regime could inflict on the US.

If no city is out of the crosshairs, how many cities could be hit, and what would the damage be? According to a leaked US intelligence report, the North has potentially 30 to 60 nukes but 12 to 30 according to civilian estimates. Such a large range of potential nukes, without factoring into account the efficacy of the US’ anti-missile systems or the ICBMs’ accuracy makes it impossible to estimate damages. Needless to say, this would permanently scar and irrevocably alter the nation’s psyche.

The Kims have always been paranoid of a foreign invasion to remove them from power and subsequently developed a nuclear weapons programme as a deterrent. If they believe they are to be removed, their fate is sealed anyway and the nukes are there to be used. On the other hand, he US government could expect both domestic and international vilification for using the nukes on or near population centres, especially as standard missiles are equally capable. A larger scale incursion, often called the ‘decapitation’ option, would seek to neutralise the military and its weapons (including nuclear warheads), remove Kim and possibly feature invasion. Alternatively, a surgical strike to remove Kim’s military capabilities could well be sufficient for Kim to fire any ICBMs remaining and begin shelling Seoul, triggering war and again lead to Kim’s removal.

Nevertheless, removing Kim from power regardless of the severity of strikes would be incredibly destabilising and with armed force as large as 1.2 million, the military death toll for the North could easily reach the hundreds of thousands. The fate of North Korea’s remaining military is hazy. The extent of the indoctrinated love for their glorious leader is uncertain and following the fall of the regime, a fraction of the armed forces will in all likelihood stay faithful and resist foreign intruders. Fanatical terrorism against the US or South Korea by the regime’s die-hard loyalists would hardly be surprising.

Reunification?

After the immediate consequences, regime change becomes the next big question. In this nuclear war scenario an invasion by the US and the South would follow the bombs to ensure the discontinuation of the Kim regime. According to the researchers, between 1950 and 2012 only 20% of regime changes saw a democracy installed. But there is reason to believe that the North could see democracy: the newly elected President Moon Jae-in backs reunification in co-operation with the North’s elite class, and what remains of the elite would be vulnerable without military capabilities. South Korea can present reunification, including its perks of saddling with a rich country and longer term peace, as a get-out for these elites.

How the people of North Korea would react to regime change is unclear. The US and South Korea are working to undermine the regime’s control over access to information and the outside world. They aim to show citizens that alternative systems of government exist, that there is life outside of poverty; for reference, the South’s economy is 80 times larger than its northern counterpart. The US funds programs that supply foreign TV shows on USB sticks or supporting defector-run foreign radio, both accessible via goods that North Koreans can increasingly find on black markets. Whilst we cannot truly ascertain how fruitful this will be, we know the people desire more and that with time, they will become dissatisfied with their system and their leaders.

North Korea is a centrally planned economy and although private enterprise has quietly expanded in the past decade and can supplement material needs, rationing is the primary distribution mechanism for many essentials. There is no way that this could continue if the North wanted reunification. This places Korea in a unique position, with two distinct challenges: firstly, the North must transition to a capitalist market economy fitting with the South, and secondly, the two countries must merge. Planners should take heed and learn the lessons of other economies that have made the transition from Communism to market capitalism: China’s gradualist approach worked spectacularly, Poland’s shock therapy soon brought it the highest growth rates in Europe, but Russia collapsed after attempting sudden reform without external help.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that immediate trade liberalisation (opening up the economy to international markets) can alleviate shortages of goods, ‘import’ relative prices to correct price controls. Conversely, liberalisation does take its toll and intensifies pressure on firms, shutting uncompetitive businesses down and raising unemployment. A North Korean state with its current structure could not provide support for the newly unemployed, especially given the likely shortages following war. This creates a rationale for the international community to support the transition with aid, be it grants or concessional loans to the North.

The North’s central planning is not the only economic obstacle to seamless reunification. Kim’s regime holds an estimated 200,000 political prisoners in camps not dissimilar to concentration camps. They need freedom. Right now, these people are being starved, tortured and mutilated – information on their atrocious treatment can be found here. All need immediate medical attention and many will require life-long support for the accompanying physical and psychological afflictions. Further integrative steps need to be taken: prisoners will need housing, educating and incorporating back into communities and the economy. It would not be hard to see released prisoners and their descendents being economically disadvantaged: with few – if any – assets or skills suitable for a modern economy, unassisted assimilation will be an uphill struggle.

One conservative estimate costs reunification at $1 trillion, the equivalent of three quarters of the South’s GDP. On the other hand, some positives for the South can come out of reunification. Financially, the South would inherit a stockpile of precious minerals valued between $6 and $10 trillion. Not only this, but the South’s population is ageing and declining, whereas the North’s is young with a higher fertility rate, which would allow Korea to postpone demographic ills (see my post on Japan for a similar story). In our context, however, the South’s appetite for reunification will rapidly diminish the harder they get hit. The South could be pushed towards reunification if it could plausibly stem the inevitable stream of refugees headed south.

Nuclear war would create millions of refugees in the North, the South and wherever Kim’s nukes may land. Although the US may not use nukes against the North, plenty will take the opportunity to migrate away and seek a better life before a new regime takes shape. Many would disperse around the globe, but for those in North Korea, far more would head north into China – the North’s longstanding ally. China strives for stability in the region: Beijing is concerned by the prospect of an American ally on its border and uses the North as a buffer, whilst an influx of refugees would bolster ties between a reunified Korea and China which could be used as leverage against China. Beijing would therefore be reluctant to accept refugees and could attempt to stabilise and contain the region instead.

It’s safe to conclude that nuclear war is the nightmare scenario. It’s nigh on impossible to describe the horror and pain that could rain down on the world. Of course, this scenario is a hypothetical conditional on nuclear war actually occuring, which is unlikely. The Kim dynasty’s goal has been survival and the primary role of their nukes is as a deterrent – they know they would perish in a war against their enemies, but holding nukes makes the US think twice about aggression. Furthermore, if the US knows that if it missteps and spooks an incredibly sensitive Kim, Seoul will burn and they risk bringing their own cities into the firing line.

 

An American Horror Story

OPIOID overdoses are escalating throughout the United States. As a mayor’s son, a sheriff’s wife and the legendary musician Prince overdose on heroin, fentanyl and other opioids, morgues fill and it becomes clear that nobody is sacred. Urged by the committee tasked with investigating the epidemic, President Trump has declared a national state of emergency.

The US’ Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that of the roughly 52,000 overdose deaths in 2015, 33,100 were specifically down to opioids, rising by 4,444 in one year. Between 2010 and 2015, heroin deaths increased 20.6% and synthetic opioids (excluding methadone, a painkiller and heroin substitute) surged by 72.2%. This is in part attributable to a surge in illegal fentanyl laboratories: fentanyl is a synthetic opioid normally prescribed for severe pain or chronic pain in patients with opioid resistance and is between 50 and 100 times stronger than morphine.

What makes fentanyl so dangerous is that it binds to opioid receptors in the brain, in the region that controls pain and emotion. When bound to these receptors, dopamine stimulates the brain’s reward centres, which is what creates the relaxation and euphoria chased by users. Unfortunately, these receptors are found elsewhere in the brain, including where the breathing rate is regulated. High doses of opiates, or an opiate as potent as fentanyl, can stop the user’s breathing, resulting in death. Moreover, street fentanyl can be laced with cocaine or heroin, augmenting the danger.

But what’s behind this crisis? What could be driving greater numbers of people to take the hardest drugs available?

The longest running element is the over-prescription of opiate-based painkillers to patients. Accidents hurt. But medical opioids as a treatment risk reliance and are a significant factor in later addiction, especially in instances of chronic pain, which is dangerous and especially unfortunate for the patient. In the 20 years following 1991, opioid prescriptions rocketed from 76m to 219m. With the spreading of opioids came an increase in their potency, paving the way for an epidemic.

Once a user becomes addicted, however, they are forced underground to play a Russian roulette of unidentifiable pills to get a fix. Even heroin is a natural progression: the CDC found that painkiller addicts are 40 times more likely to be addicted to heroin. As previously mentioned, unregulated fentanyl has flooded the blacket market. Fentanyl’s obscene strength fetches it an eye-watering price: whilst a kilogram of heroin is valued at $50,000, a kilogram of fentanyl can rake in $1m, hence the desire to peddle it.

However, unknown tablets of opioid are rightly far less trustworthy than branded prescription painkillers and a tightening of prescriptions in recent years has presented a profitable opportunity for suppliers to counterfeit tablets. Of course these tablets contain fentanyl, but when only 0.25mg can kill, many batches easily overshoot the dosage, delivering deadly results. It’s likely most taking fentanyl are clueless they are doing so.

What can be done to ease the crisis?

Clamping down on the supply of counterfeit pills containing fentanyl is an obvious starting place. Shutting down the labs is easier said than done, as much of the supply originates from China. Chinese legislature is scrambling to keep up with the new fentanyl variants the clandestine labs are producing, and banning one form only prompts another to replace it. As of the 1st of March, 2017, China has banned four main strains of fentanyl for manufacturing and sale. This should help stem the tide, though for long the ban will remain effective is unknown.

Work on the root of the epidemic must start soon. Opioids must be prescribed far less frequently and in lower doses, especially for patients with chronic pain rather than short-term pain. Recent CDC guidelines for opioid usage suggest patients seek alternative treatments, be it non-opioid medications, physical therapy, electrical stimulation, acupuncture or an array of others. If opioids are to be prescribed, doses should “start low and go slow”, minimising the risk that patients build tolerance and seek higher doses elsewhere.

Existing users must be given greater access to treatments to detoxify and rehabilitate. By declaring a state of national emergency, President Trump has opened up some options. This could speed the government’s ability to adapt legislature, improve communication and co-ordination between charities and agencies, unlock funding and expand access to treatments.

Under state of emergency the US government could negotiate down the price of treatment drugs, as in the 2001 anthrax mania: the declaration, plus the threatening pharmaceuticals company Bayer with buying cheap generic alternatives allowed the government to stockpile several million Cipro tablets – the antibiotic treatment – at a discount of over 80%. Pharmaceutical treatments such as Suboxone exist to ease withdrawal symptoms and stave off the cravings. Naloxone can reverse the immediate effects of heroin and return regular breathing in overdoses. This would be a start: cheaper Suboxone in particular could help addicts wean themselves to sobriety and wider public holding of Naloxone could save lives.

To declare a national emergency for an ongoing health crisis is unprecedented. Previous declarations have been for short, immediate crises such as Hurricane Katrina or the September 11th attacks. Trump must use this vital period to act on the primary recommendations of the Opioids Committee to prevent future addictions. Tightening of opioid prescription policy is crucial to reforms. Only then will the bodies stop piling up.

The New Silk Road

PRESIDENT Xi Jinping of China is hard selling the most ambitious infrastructure project the world would ever see. Named the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR), the project comprises a series of ports, pipelines, power stations, railways and roads to secure and expand China’s trade links to the world, covering at 65 countries. The name conjures romantic imagery of camels carrying silks through the desert, based on the old Silk Road that exported silks to Europe. As populist nationalist movements have gained traction in the West, Jinping has eyed an opportunity to gain influence in the world order by preaching the rewards of revitalising globalisation. OBOR is an opportunity to take advantage of the US’ retreating influence under Donald Trump’s presidency.

Evaluating the benefits of OBOR are incredibly difficult. The world’s second largest project, the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the Second World War, only had a current-day value of $103bn. Estimated to cost around $1 trillion, OBOR is 10 times the size and encompasses far more countries with far more diversely structured economies than postwar Western Europe. Measures of the financial gain to China, therefore, are unlikely to be accurate, but the chief economic benefits come in the form of greater access to foreign markets. This creates opportunities for export-led growth and greater certainty and security of raw material supplies. Having invested heavily in high-tech industry, OBOR would stand China in good stead to support its manufacturing base.

OBOR also offers a solution to geopolitical issues. The highly contended South China Sea has long been a strategic headache for China: for its ships to reach the rest of the world, they pass by a multitude of countries, including Japan, the Korean peninsula and Vietnam. Were these powers to blockade China’s maritime access to the world, China would be unable to export, the very thing it built its success on as capitalist economy and a huge threat to its continued growth. The Pakistani city of Gwadar offers a solution to this. Pakistan borders south-western China and has access to the Arabian Sea, which provides China with an alternative route out to sea and is why a state-owned Chinese company signed a 40-year lease on a port there.

Infrastructure projects in foreign countries entwines China tighter into the global economy and they become a much larger player in the world. This is especially true now that the US has withdrawn from the Transatlantic Trade Partnership, a trade deal between countries in the Pacific region, and that Donald Trump is somewhat considered a joke in the West. Interdependent blocs of countries are far less prone to conflicts and more open to co-operation, so OBOR stands to hand greater power to the Communist Party for use in future conflicts.

China is using its big state-owned banks to provide financing for other countries, including developing countries with weak credit ratings such as Djibouti. Earlier this year, a railway – built and financed by China, of course – opened between Djibouti and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Although Djibouti is enjoying steady economic growth of 6.7%, its government lacks transparency, its debts have hit 60% of GDP, the IMF puts unemployment at 39% and almost 1 in 4 live in extreme poverty. Should the project fail to bolster growth, or adverse economic conditions batter growth, Djibouti will find itself in hot water with the Chinese – little is known about the terms of the loans or how their creditors will use their leverage.

What is clear is that China is taking a gamble. Chinese government debt relative to the size of their economy has risen sharply, rising almost 20 percentage points since the Global Financial Crash. Total debt, including household, government and corporate debt, has risen by 100 percentage points in just as long. If OBOR cannot kickstart slowing growth, then OBOR fuelling a pile-up of debt risks a 2008 US-style financial crash or an extended struggle with deflation and low growth, as happened in Japan. Not only this, but China has a poor track record of cost-effective infrastructure construction. If previous builds, such as a railway in Kenya that was four times more expensive than the international average, then spending will vastly exceed the initial budget. But if the net economic benefits are uncertain – and moreover, the benefits of a better spot in the international pecking order – then why is Xinping pushing OBOR so hard?

One must consider that as well as factors pulling China to OBOR, there are push factors. Growth has slowed in recent years. It is steady, but the people of China have come to expect living standards to always be on the up. Whilst they rapidly become better off, they may tolerate the more unsavoury aspects of being ruled by the Communist Party: a democratic deficit, a poor human rights record. But if life stopped improving, why should they continue to tolerate such governance?

A sufficiently large enough spark could create enough civil discourse for regions of China to break away and declare independence. Tibet is the most likely territory to break, but Xinjiang is strategically the most crucial. It borders eight countries and is China’s land access point to the rest of the continent – without it, China would depend heavily on the South China Sea, which would only lead to greater tensions. Not only could OBOR help postpone a slowdown in growth and buy the Communist Party time to find the next growth cure, but OBOR helps anchor Xinjiang to China, quelling future independence movements.

It soon becomes obvious that OBOR is driven by the state, rather than commerce. The initiative is economically risky and could end in financial meltdown, but if pulled off successfully, it presents an excellent vehicle to heighten China’s standing in the world order. Given previous projects, the initiative is highly likely to go far over budget and it is unclear whether it will see full fruition, especially as it requires so many deals to be struck. Having peddled the dream so openly, the full virtue of soft power will come from completion, but the more individual projects completed, the closer China gets to financial ruin and egg on their proverbial international face. Jinping faces quite the balancing act.

 

Credit: Featured Image via Reuters

State-sponsored Romance

JAPAN is amidst a testing phase of demographic transition. Not only is it another advanced economy facing an ageing population, but twinned with this is a shrinking population. An ageing population alone brings pains: higher incidence of degenerative disease means more resources must be dedicated to health and social care, presenting opportunity costs. A proportionately diminished working population then face a higher tax burden to fund extra pensions in addition to regular the government provisions.

The problems of a shrinking population are less well known. Lower demand for goods and services means that businesses are less able to exploit economies of scale, making production more costly. Assets become surplus to requirements: for example, unoccupied houses drive down house prices and reduce wealth, whilst operating schools and hospitals with spare capacity is inefficient. The benefits of clustering – the spread of knowledge and competition to innovate – are lost when populations decrease.

In order to boost fertility, the government needs to understand what is suppressing it. Several social and economic factors are at play. Raising a child in modern Japan is expensive and many prospective parents feel strong social pressures to provide a good life for their children – the most significant feature of which is increasingly expensive education. If couples feel pressured to only have children when they can provide sufficient resources, they will choose to postpone and/or have fewer children.

Additionally, women are marrying later. For women, a choice must be made between working and raising children; whilst both are possible, Japanese society does no favours for working mothers. Men and older women hold conservative views of the woman’s role in a child’s upbringing, believing that women should stay at home and focus on the child rather than return to work. Mothers struggle to return to work after children for a range of reasons, most commonly that childcare hours are not a suitable fit for working hours and because men spend considerably less time helping with housework and with the children than in the US, Germany and Sweden. Young women are warming to the idea that there is more to life than motherhood. Given the choice, many are choosing to have a career first, especially if it means they are better able to provide for their child.

Marriage rates are also falling. This isn’t a phenomenon unique to Japan, but unlike other advanced economies, the abandonment of marriage is not being matched by a rise in couples cohabiting. The problem is that young singletons are struggling to meet each other and when this happens, fertility falls. Women are pressured into finding high earning men, but more and more young people are relying on temporary and part-time jobs and the ideal man is becoming unattainable for both sexes: men concentrate on their career whilst women look for better. Romantic expectations need to readjust to the new economic reality. Compensating for less permanent work, young people are working longer hours, but this serves to further isolate singletons.

Whilst some may point to the estimated one million hikikomori that shut themselves in their bedrooms away from their peers or prefer to seek romantic connection in dating games, the vast majority of Japanese men are capable of and desire marriage. The hikikomori are likely a symptom of the frustration felt by many young men struggling to meet expectations that have not changed with the economy.

If these are the root causes of Japan’s demographic transition, what can be done? One common solution to ageing populations is to invite young migrants to live and work. Educated abroad, young workers don’t need schooling and require less healthcare than their elders, so can help reduce the tax burden on the working population. Additionally, if the low birth rate is partly a feature of Japanese culture, greater cultural diversity could raise fertility. However, historically isolationists, the Japanese are averse to immigration despite it being a remedy to their demographic ills.

Instead, the government is opting to stabilise the domestic birth rate using policies such as konkatsu: holding match-making events for young people to meet and socialise, with the intention of finding a partner. The government has created more nursery places, which alleviates the cost of children and can allow mothers to return to work, which may have been holding them back. Trying to reduce working hours to give young people the time to socialise would help them meet each other.

If the government’s policies do not begin reversing the loss of fertility, Japan may well soon be forced to adopt immigration. The most direct solution – influencing societal attitudes on the role of women and the ideal partner – would likely be the most effective and long-termist, however it is a Herculean task for a government alone. Change must come from within society, from the young, but it is unclear whether change is coming rapidly enough to prevent a demographic crisis.

Labour and the Conservatives: Where are we now?

IT has been an excellent year so far for Jeremy Corbyn. At the beginning of 2017, Corbyn eyed September’s Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) Annual General Meeting to change the party’s internal rules to make it easier for MPs to enter leadership contests. Currently, a candidate requires backing from 15% of the party’s MPs; Corbyn wishes to reduce that to 5%, benefitting his faction of Labour MPs who have struggled to reach the minimum threshold. Corbyn himself only reached the threshold minutes before the deadline. Labour muddled along until April, releasing a string of policy proposals with moderate success. These include raising the number of national holidays in line with other high income countries and a crackdown on late payments from big business to small firms. Could he last until September, Corbyn would prolong his Labour revolution past his stewardship.

At the start of the campaign, think tanks forecast Labour MPs from the moderate and ‘Blairite’ wings – Corbyn’s critics from within the party – to lose proportionately more seats than Corbyn’s faction. Even if the abysmal projections for Labour had come true, the party’s left would have struggled on with greater control, regardless of whether they could survive as a major electoral force. By gaining seats in the face of a widely anticipated death knell, Corbyn remains at the helm, emboldened. More importantly, he has proven to the other factions that the left wing of the party is capable of running the party. Prominent rebels, such as Chuka Umunna, are once again behind Corbyn with potential for inclusion in the shadow cabinet, and Labour stands again as a substantial political force.

Not wishing to overstate Labour’s success, it must be stated there is plenty of work to be done before they can form a functioning government. Yet, momentum is on Corbyn’s side and the dust is yet to settle. His popularity on social media will bode him well as social media gradually becomes a top source of news, perceivably helping him to continue engaging the young. May’s newfound unpopularity, plus Brexit biting into living standards, would leave Labour in a strong position come the next election, likely following the conclusion of negotiations. Having said that, Corbyn himself has shown us that a lot can change in a very short period of time.

Big gambles do not appear to be paying off in UK politics. In a bid to satisfy his party’s sizeable Eurosceptic wing, David Cameron’s referendum on EU membership spectacularly backfired, ultimately costing his job and what currently looks like the country’s future prospects. A second Conservative gamble to make Theresa May more powerful did exactly the opposite, turning a majority into a minority. Losing the majority invited criticism from her MPs over her methods of running government, her policies and her supposed mandate for hard Brexit. The Remainers in her party are empowered, with Philip Hammond putting forward his alternative vision for Brexit Britain.

A hushed battle is going on between Tory MPs: as senior figures declared her time is limited if she cannot save her premiership, May’s supporters are urging unity within the party for stability during negotiations. If a coup were to happen, you can bet it would be swift and efficient, lest a bungled attempt detract from negotiations and risk branding the Conservatives as the party that took the UK out of Europe and made it a failure. What is clear is that given her failures campaigning, her colleagues will not allow her to run again.

Mrs May is now stuck between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, the hardline Brexiteer faction in the Tories, the rightwing media and her support from ex-UKIP voters are pushing for a hard Brexit, citing the 52% of voters backing Leave. On the other hand, May has lost her majority and is getting into bed with the DUP, who back a soft Brexit and seek freedom of movement between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Additionally, the Scottish Conservatives would be foolish to ignore that Scotland voted remain by 62% having only just resurfaced, securing 13 seats – enough to matter as much as the DUP. If May wants to pass any laws during her tenure, ignoring either their Scottish counterparts’ or the DUP’s soft Brexit preferences could see her frustrated with an ineffective government. Both of these are on top of Remainer rebels and the other main parties: Labour, the Lib Dems and the SNP, none of which will give May an easy ride. The balancing act between the hard and soft Brexit camps will give the PM quite the headache.

This year’s reversal of fortunes has seen a return to two-party politics. As the most important negotiations of a generation will require a strong opposition to hold the government to account, it’s just in time too.

On Britain’s Snap Election: Theresa’s Troubles

TWO months ago, the notion Theresa May could lose her majority was laughable. On Friday morning, 2,227 votes were all that blocked a so-called Progressive Alliance forming with a Labour government at the helm. Despite Labour failing to secure the most seats, Theresa’s most salient achievement was that Jeremy Corbyn emerged perhaps the strongest leader in UK politics, using his momentum to call for her resignation and thus framing her as a failure in the eyes of the country – a 10th of June Survation survey has 49% think she should resign vs only 38% she should not.

There will be more fallout from this election than any for a generation, with severe ramifications and deep rethinking needed for all major players. The mountain supporting May as Conservative Leader is suddenly now thin ice, and whilst Brexit negotiations and the genuine need for a clear, coherent UK negotiating position could keep the wolves at bay, prominent Tories are unlikely to risk further haemorrhaging at the next election. Cough, Boris, cough. The Conservatives find themselves relying on the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a socially right-wing Northern Irish party with whom they share few similar stances, to cobble together a coalition. I will focus on the fallout in other blog posts, but for now: what went wrong for the Tories?

The Conservatives called the election and ran on the premise of ‘strong and stable leadership’, a phrase I wish to purge from memory, and strengthening the UK’s negotiating hand (oops). Aside from their pro-Brexit position, little else stood out as positively unique to this Conservative manifesto. The usual promises of reduced net immigration, a relatively unsubstantial increase in the NHS budget (£8bn vs Labour’s £32bn), meeting defence spending commitments and cherishing Trident, and slashing corporation tax to attract and retain big business were all thrown in.

However, their notorious attempt at policy innovation, branded the ‘Dementia Tax’ whereby the elderly would pay for social care using the value of their home, provoked heavy backlash and a series of U-turns. Whilst this was a genuine attempt to tackle the growing burden of an ageing population on social care, the reform was ill thought-out and poked holes in the strong and stable guise. Labour, having promised extra funding for social care, seized the opportunity to smear them as weak and wobbly. Further adding to the anger was the revelation that Nick Timothy, one of the recently resigned duo of May’s closest advisors, added the policy to the manifesto only the night before it was released, without Cabinet ministers’ approval. Were the Tories’ strength not Brexit, backed overwhelmingly by the over 65s, this policy could have hurt their support among a core voter base.

It’s clear now that two key factors in the failure of the Tories’ gambit was that they called the election on the thinly-veiled ambition of sweeping away a seemingly weak opposition in order to push through their negotiation aims – a hard Brexit.

Glaringly obvious in the neon illumination of hindsight, arrogance has been hailed another detrimental feature of the campaign. Calling the election on the presumption that May would receive their votes then refusing to debate the other leaders and engage with citizens – as is a staple component of the democratic process – can and should be labelled nothing but disdain for voters. Such alienation could only have played well for Corbyn, who has long sought for a “new, gentler kind of politics” to bring onboard previously disillusioned voter segments.

Midway through the campaign, journalists reported instances where the crowds of ‘ordinary voters’ Theresa faced as she toured the country were Conservative party activists, or where activists had held the microphone for reporters with the purpose of preventing them from asking unscripted questions. This played out well for Corbyn, who appeared comfortable and enthusiastic with the general public, most visably relaxed during the live audience interviews rounding off the campaign. As Corbyn grew into the campaign, May appeared scared to face the public for fear of losing her lead.

As found by FiveThirtyEight, a polling aggregator, the ‘Shy Tory’ effect is not on average present when the Tories already lead the polls. There is however, a kickback against the ‘conventional wisdom’, suggesting the public don’t like being told how they’re going to vote. Calling the election based on this conventional wisdom with this effect present, it seems, was not a good idea. The clarity of this is perhaps the biggest pain in her post-election headache as Corbyn piles on the pressure and surpasses her in the polls. Another surprise to the polls is the Green Party’s kamikaze: in efforts to prevent a Conservative victory, their candidates stood down in 38 seats as not to split the progressive vote, helping Labour and the Lib Dems to take nine seats from the Conservatives.

By making the campaign about Brexit, voters were also given the opportunity to air their discontent with the government’s negotiating aims and methods. Whilst many Remain voters have come to terms with Britain leaving the EU, as hinted by the demise of the Lib Dems and their anti-Brexit campaign, Mrs May opting for the sharpest possible exit from the EU with prominent members of her party having a history of antagonising the ‘Brussels Bureaucrats’, namely Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, a divisive figure since the Referendum, and Michael Howard, appearing to threaten war with Spain over Gibraltar. Meanwhile, having accepted the referendum result, Corbyn’s seemingly vague soft Brexit stance with a non-confrontational tone has created an additional arena for a protest vote. The hard stance did help pick up UKIP voters, but cost them a 2% on average in Remain voting areas. Comparatively, Labour picked up 12% in Remain areas.

Interlinked with Remain voters is the youth vote. Young voters, aged 20-24 voted 62% Labour vs 22% Conservative. A prominent explanation for this is that Labour ‘bribed’ the young with the last minute policy of cancelling university tuition fees for students. Of course, which current or prospective student would not opt to do away with £27,000 debt plus interest repayments for the standard three year course? Not to mention that older generations could get by without university education with degrees now becoming increasingly in demand. But it is overly simplistic to suggest tuition fees are the only policy that appealed to the young. Seniors have long benefitted from real rises in house prices, whilst the young have found it increasingly harder to acquire footing on the property ladder. The Labour pledge to build one million new homes not only seeks to subdue a housing crisis, it constitutes a wider economic programme of investment in public services, national infrastructure and skills. In the eyes of the young, the Conservative campaign centred on Brexit did not match up to Labour’s investment for the future.

Ironically, shining a spotlight on the widely perceived weak leader in Mr Corbyn finally gave him the opportunity to show off his strength as a leader: campaigning. As he relaxed and seemed to enjoy himself, May’s campaigning inadequacies – avoiding the common citizen’s scrutiny and parroting catchphrases – handed him rapid gains from a rock bottom starting point. A large manifesto reversal haunted the middle of her campaign and unpopularity with the younger population contributed to her opposition’s unexpected boost.