TWO months ago, the notion Theresa May could lose her majority was laughable. On Friday morning, 2,227 votes were all that blocked a so-called Progressive Alliance forming with a Labour government at the helm. Despite Labour failing to secure the most seats, Theresa’s most salient achievement was that Jeremy Corbyn emerged perhaps the strongest leader in UK politics, using his momentum to call for her resignation and thus framing her as a failure in the eyes of the country – a 10th of June Survation survey has 49% think she should resign vs only 38% she should not.
There will be more fallout from this election than any for a generation, with severe ramifications and deep rethinking needed for all major players. The mountain supporting May as Conservative Leader is suddenly now thin ice, and whilst Brexit negotiations and the genuine need for a clear, coherent UK negotiating position could keep the wolves at bay, prominent Tories are unlikely to risk further haemorrhaging at the next election. Cough, Boris, cough. The Conservatives find themselves relying on the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a socially right-wing Northern Irish party with whom they share few similar stances, to cobble together a coalition. I will focus on the fallout in other blog posts, but for now: what went wrong for the Tories?
The Conservatives called the election and ran on the premise of ‘strong and stable leadership’, a phrase I wish to purge from memory, and strengthening the UK’s negotiating hand (oops). Aside from their pro-Brexit position, little else stood out as positively unique to this Conservative manifesto. The usual promises of reduced net immigration, a relatively unsubstantial increase in the NHS budget (£8bn vs Labour’s £32bn), meeting defence spending commitments and cherishing Trident, and slashing corporation tax to attract and retain big business were all thrown in.
However, their notorious attempt at policy innovation, branded the ‘Dementia Tax’ whereby the elderly would pay for social care using the value of their home, provoked heavy backlash and a series of U-turns. Whilst this was a genuine attempt to tackle the growing burden of an ageing population on social care, the reform was ill thought-out and poked holes in the strong and stable guise. Labour, having promised extra funding for social care, seized the opportunity to smear them as weak and wobbly. Further adding to the anger was the revelation that Nick Timothy, one of the recently resigned duo of May’s closest advisors, added the policy to the manifesto only the night before it was released, without Cabinet ministers’ approval. Were the Tories’ strength not Brexit, backed overwhelmingly by the over 65s, this policy could have hurt their support among a core voter base.
It’s clear now that two key factors in the failure of the Tories’ gambit was that they called the election on the thinly-veiled ambition of sweeping away a seemingly weak opposition in order to push through their negotiation aims – a hard Brexit.
Glaringly obvious in the neon illumination of hindsight, arrogance has been hailed another detrimental feature of the campaign. Calling the election on the presumption that May would receive their votes then refusing to debate the other leaders and engage with citizens – as is a staple component of the democratic process – can and should be labelled nothing but disdain for voters. Such alienation could only have played well for Corbyn, who has long sought for a “new, gentler kind of politics” to bring onboard previously disillusioned voter segments.
Midway through the campaign, journalists reported instances where the crowds of ‘ordinary voters’ Theresa faced as she toured the country were Conservative party activists, or where activists had held the microphone for reporters with the purpose of preventing them from asking unscripted questions. This played out well for Corbyn, who appeared comfortable and enthusiastic with the general public, most visably relaxed during the live audience interviews rounding off the campaign. As Corbyn grew into the campaign, May appeared scared to face the public for fear of losing her lead.
As found by FiveThirtyEight, a polling aggregator, the ‘Shy Tory’ effect is not on average present when the Tories already lead the polls. There is however, a kickback against the ‘conventional wisdom’, suggesting the public don’t like being told how they’re going to vote. Calling the election based on this conventional wisdom with this effect present, it seems, was not a good idea. The clarity of this is perhaps the biggest pain in her post-election headache as Corbyn piles on the pressure and surpasses her in the polls. Another surprise to the polls is the Green Party’s kamikaze: in efforts to prevent a Conservative victory, their candidates stood down in 38 seats as not to split the progressive vote, helping Labour and the Lib Dems to take nine seats from the Conservatives.
By making the campaign about Brexit, voters were also given the opportunity to air their discontent with the government’s negotiating aims and methods. Whilst many Remain voters have come to terms with Britain leaving the EU, as hinted by the demise of the Lib Dems and their anti-Brexit campaign, Mrs May opting for the sharpest possible exit from the EU with prominent members of her party having a history of antagonising the ‘Brussels Bureaucrats’, namely Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, a divisive figure since the Referendum, and Michael Howard, appearing to threaten war with Spain over Gibraltar. Meanwhile, having accepted the referendum result, Corbyn’s seemingly vague soft Brexit stance with a non-confrontational tone has created an additional arena for a protest vote. The hard stance did help pick up UKIP voters, but cost them a 2% on average in Remain voting areas. Comparatively, Labour picked up 12% in Remain areas.
Interlinked with Remain voters is the youth vote. Young voters, aged 20-24 voted 62% Labour vs 22% Conservative. A prominent explanation for this is that Labour ‘bribed’ the young with the last minute policy of cancelling university tuition fees for students. Of course, which current or prospective student would not opt to do away with £27,000 debt plus interest repayments for the standard three year course? Not to mention that older generations could get by without university education with degrees now becoming increasingly in demand. But it is overly simplistic to suggest tuition fees are the only policy that appealed to the young. Seniors have long benefitted from real rises in house prices, whilst the young have found it increasingly harder to acquire footing on the property ladder. The Labour pledge to build one million new homes not only seeks to subdue a housing crisis, it constitutes a wider economic programme of investment in public services, national infrastructure and skills. In the eyes of the young, the Conservative campaign centred on Brexit did not match up to Labour’s investment for the future.
Ironically, shining a spotlight on the widely perceived weak leader in Mr Corbyn finally gave him the opportunity to show off his strength as a leader: campaigning. As he relaxed and seemed to enjoy himself, May’s campaigning inadequacies – avoiding the common citizen’s scrutiny and parroting catchphrases – handed him rapid gains from a rock bottom starting point. A large manifesto reversal haunted the middle of her campaign and unpopularity with the younger population contributed to her opposition’s unexpected boost.
Student Scribblings 